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There is no doubt that the Electric vehicle is the future of the auto mobile industry and it has 
become a matter of survival for automobile industry if they don’t delve into the Electric vehicle 
segment in the next 10 years.  Hence it the current and future outlook of the Electric vehicle 
segment for any automotive company forms and important component for any company, 
especially for huge traditional OEMs like Ford who are dependent on Internal combustion 
vehicles are struggling to make the shift.  I have dissected the curious case of Ford lacking a 
clear strategy for the EV segment despite been an innovation leader in this industry for more 
than 100 years. I have identified the possible reasons of Ford’s murky strategy and how it 
would it evolve in future and how did it impact when forecasting the value of the company for 
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EVs are poised to be the biggest growth driver of the automobile 
industry and are set to largely replace ICE vehicles within in the next 
10-20 years. Like most automakers Ford also had big ambitions about 
EV. In 2016, it announced that it has planned to launch 30+ EV by 
20205. However, they had to rescind their statement in 2019 as of 2019 
they delivered only 4 vehicles EV vehicles and those 4 were hybrid 
vehicles rather than full E.V. It will only launch its first pure EV by 
2021. We have analysed and tried to understand why Ford were not able 
to meet its EV commitment and how much impact would that have in 
the long run. 
The segment is still in its nascent phase but just like every other industry 
a head start in R&D and innovation in the early stages gives an edge to 
the companies and they reap the ensuing competitive advantage for 
several years.   
 
1.1 Ford’s reactivity towards EV 
 
Ford has been torpid in its EV approach. It only recently launched its 
first plug in EV (the Mach-E) and has just 4 hybrid vehicles in its lineup, 
all of which failed to compete with the likes of Tesla in the U.S., BYD 
in China and Toyota, BMW, Renault in Europe. 
Ford’s hybrid EV sales only constitute 0.38% of the total vehicles sold 
globally in 2019. It has the worst EV to total vehicles sold ratio among 
the 10 biggest automobile companies in this world.  
Ford’s and other U.S. automaker’s lethargic approach towards EVs 
allowed Tesla to gain a market share of 81.6% in the segment as of 2019. 
It would be extremely difficult for Ford to claw back a piece from 
Tesla’s pie as it is years behind it in terms of technology. 
Ford’s focus on its ICE segment will probably be good for the 
company’s bottom line in the short- to medium-term, but the high 
opportunity cost is bound to catch up to them in the long-term in the 
form of lower future EV sales. EVs are expected to account for 10% of 
global automobile sales by 2026.  
Ford’s projections being on the lower end of the spectrum for 2026 
imply that they are underprepared and will likely continue to trail the 
larger plug-in market even until the end of decade, 2030, when EVs are 
expected to make up almost 28% of the global automotive sales. 
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Ford’s new CEO, Jim Farley, has admitted that Ford is still taking baby 
steps in the EV market, but has committed that market should expect a 
quick turnaround from the company given its historic R&D and financial 
prowess. 
He also helmed the launch of Ford’s first ever plug-in SUV, the Mustang 
Mach-E, which was announced under his predecessor, but saw a 
renewed focus under current management. It is set to compete against 
the likes of Tesla Model Y, Audi E-Tron, Volvo Polestar 2, etc.  
The good news here is that despite the being late to the game, Ford hasn’t 
come empty handed as Mach-E looks to be competitively specced and 
priced with a 300-mile range for its mid-tier, $50,000 model. This pits 
it directly against the segment leader, Tesla’s Model Y, which boasts of 
a 325-mile range at an identical price. Given the competition’s slightly 
better range, superior technology and much more favorable brand 
perception, Ford will have to really go all out on the Mach-E’s marketing 
efforts to start clawing back a reasonable share of the market. It’s 
success with this platform will give investors important clues regarding 
the company’s future in this critical segment. 
. 
2   Forecasting Ford Mustang Mach-E’s sales  
 
Ford Mustang Mach E, its first EV is going to be launched in Q1 2021 
in the U.S and Europe, china market. Ford has planned to produce 
50,000 units for the year with each unit at an average retail price of 
$50,000. The vehicle has already garnered a lot of interest but it would 
have to face stiff competition from the likes of Tesla, BMW,Audi and a 
bunch of start-ups.   
According to the pre booking data Ford has already got 41,000 
reservations. It is expected that would each its full limit by the end of 
the year. According to Ford’s history on average 70% people who 
reserve buy the car and the remaining 30% could easily be sold once its 
officially launched. Hence, we expect that Ford will be able to sell out 
all 50,000 vehicles as it’s the current demand comfortably exceeds that 
 
Vehicles sold  Average price ($) Revenue ($ million) 
50,000 50,000 2500 
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The forecasted revenue for this vehicle is 2500 million for 2021 which 
is 2.1% of the total projected revenues for the company, However the 
catch here is that Ford is likely to make a loss on this model due to high 
fixed costs associated with it and no economies of scale has not been 
achieved at an optimum level for it. Moreover, the selling and 
administrative expenses would be also high.  Hence it is likely that in 
terms of net profit the $ 500 million dollar of impact would be nullified 
or to be 1.5%-2% in the best-case scenario. 
Another important point is EVs have a high depreciation on its 
Maximum retail price as the technology keeps evolving every year and 
it is expected that Mach -E’s 1st model would only last for 2 years in the 
retail showrooms. Ford had expected a depreciation of 20% which 
would dent its profit further.  
Hence assimilating this information into our valuation. Ford Mach E 
sales would not cause any major changes in the company Forecast for 
the next few years.  Ford would have to launch more EVs and decrease 
its fixed costs to be able to add some value.  
 
2.1 Impact on valuation  
 
All in all, while the Mach-E looks promising, the overall future of the 
company in this segment is still quite uncertain. While Ford is quick to 
push out statements to shareholders regarding its plans about EVs, those 
statements are seldom followed by timely, orderly action. This is the 
reason why we chose to segment our revenue forecast by geography 
instead of drivetrain. However, our growth rates still implicitly account 
for our view of Ford’s future in the EV segment in each of its major 
geographical market. EVs will play the biggest role in North America, 
then in Europe, and then finally in China. Their impact in Ford’s other 
market will likely be immaterial in the long-run due to their economic 
make-up and their miniscule contribution to Ford’s current sales.  
According to our estimates, Ford has planned to launch roughly 40 EVs 
globally over the next 5-10 years, including an ecosystem of electric 
commercial vehicles. However, only 3 have been confirmed so far. 
Thus, taking the current pace of development into account, we have 
estimated that it will sell around 200,000 EVs globally by 2026, which 
would account for just ~4.5% of its sales by volume. This is quite low 
compared to the projected industry average of 10%. 
Our approach would have been different if Ford had a concrete roadmap 
for EVs which it faithfully followed and thus had some positive results 
to show for itself. In that case, EVs would have a higher % in the total 




3 Final remarks on Ford’s EV segment 
 
For Ford to up its EV game a radical change would be required in its 
strategy. Ford’s priority now should be a comprehensive follow up after 
its promising debut by aggressively pursuing R&D in the field, 
especially in battery technology as that is one of the biggest hurdles to 
mass adoption of the platform. Launching a few more EVs would just 
not cut it. Other than the traditional OEMs, it is competing against 
cutting edge startups like Nio, Rivian, Xiapeng, Faraday, etc., and lot of 
them are backed by large VCs with deep pockets and are laser-focused 
on this platform and its intricacies. 
There is a possibility that we could see Ford acquiring a leading EV 
startup because that would be the fastest way to compensate for its slow 
start. In that case the valuation metrics for Ford’s EV market could have 
been different. However, the valuation of leading startups currently is 
sky high and Ford would likely to shell out billions of dollars that could 
already put more pressure on its high debt and the $11billion 
restructuring plans.    
Moreover, it already bought a minor stake in Rivian for $500 million 
USD and had supposedly planned to use its EV technology for its luxury 
brand Lincoln to launch a Lincoln EV by 2021 but that project has been 
put on the hold this year and the vehicle would not be launched before 
2023. Ford’s partnership with Rivian has been quite nontransparent and 
there are no concrete signs improvements in Ford’s future EV business 
through this partnership hence while forecasting our sales we assumed 
that Ford would not acquire any major EV startup and bulk of its EV 
research and sales would be under its own brand. 
Ford Mach-E looks promising but the EV future of the company looks 
uncertain. Ford keeps the shareholders updated with the new statements 
about EV, but those statements have not resulted in concrete actions and 
the ones that did have been delayed. Due to this reason, we have decided 
not to create a specific separation of sales of EV in our valuation model 
and decided to split the revenues according to the geography. However, 
in the growth rate of our geographic distribution of revenues we have 
taken Ford’s EV forecast into account but given the small percentage of 
EV into the total vehicle sales it is the performance of the ICE vehicles 
which would drive the growth of the company until 2026.  
Our approach would have been different if Ford had a concrete roadmap 
for EV with some positive results to show. In that case EV would have 
a higher % in the total sales probably in double figures and Ford’s 
growth rate would have been above industry average 
     




4 The Black-Scholes model: Valuing equity as 
an option 
 
Given the unique combination of a business facing major industrial 
headwinds, a generational economic shock and the high level of 
financial leverage involved, we thought it would be interesting to value 
Ford’s equity as a derivative, specifically a call option, using the Black-
Scholes model.  
This method is useful when analyzing firms that are struggling and are 
in a distress or near-distress state (Damodaran, Investment Valuation: 
Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset, 2012). 
The reasoning is that the underlying asset in this case is the enterprise 
value of the firm computed using a DCF and the strike price is the face 
value of the firm’s outstanding debt. A distress/near-distress state means 
that the value of the asset (in this case, Ford Motor Co.) is not too far 
from the strike price (Ford’s total financial obligations), and therefore 
the equity can be reasonably valued as a call. It is crucial that both these 
numbers are reasonably close to each other. This is not the case when 
the firm in question is well run and their enterprise value far outweighs 
their total debt burden. In such cases, the total value of the underlying 
assets is too far away from the strike price for the model to be of any 
practical use as it would be equivalent to calculating the value of an 
absurdly far-OTM option. 
 
The duration of the call in this case was the face value weighted average 
duration of Ford’s outstanding bond issues, and the variance of the 
underlying asset was taken from (Damodaran, Standard Deviations by 









Table 1: Final inputs into the Black-Scholes model. 
 
The above inputs result in an equity value of $63.799B, which translates 
to a basic price per share of $16.06 which drops down marginally to 
$15.93 when accounting for full dilution. These values are roughly 75% 
higher than the current market price and ones yielded by our DCF 
valuation.  
When thinking about the reasons behind such a big difference, it is 
important to keep in mind the underlying mechanics at play here. First, 
the outputs of these two models are not independent as the DCF 
valuation is one of the inputs into the option valuation. Second, the 
Black-Scholes model makes certain assumptions about the prices 
(normally distributed), returns (lognormally distributed) and volatility 
(constant for the duration of the option) in the market, all of which make 
more sense when looking at the aggregate behaviour of the market but 
do not necessarily reflect adequately the nuances of every individual 
business and security. This lack of specificity is why the output of the 
Black-Scholes model here should be taken with a healthy dose of 
skepticism. It is, instead, best viewed as representing a right-tail 





5 Valuation using EV/EBITA multiple 
 
To gain a more market-based perspective on Ford with respect to its 
peers, we valued it using the EV/EBITA multiples. On our choice of 
multiple, from (McKinsey & Company, 2015): -  
“Using enterprise value to EBITA (or NOPLAT) rather than a P/E 
eliminates the distorting effect of different capital structures, 
nonoperating assets, and nonoperating income statement items (such as 
the nonoperating portion of pension expense). Any item that isn’t a 
helpful indicator of a company’s future cash-generating ability should 
be excluded from the calculation of the multiple.” 
 
 
        Table 3: Valuing Ford using EV/EBITA multiple for 2020Q3. 
 
This valuation stands firmly in contrast to the Black-Scholes one as it 
represents a left-tail outcome for the company, albeit one that is not as 
extreme as the one we considered in our sensitivity analysis during the 
DCF. However, despite having a different output, it suffers from the 
same weaknesses as that of the Black-Scholes, namely an overreliance 
on current market dynamics which in-turn reflect both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks, and it is very difficult to separate them by just 
looking at current prices. Thus, it makes sense to take this value with a 










Ford EV = Median * EBITA 122.11
Less: Debt -113.73
Equity ($ billion) 8.38
Shares outstanding (in billion) 3.90
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Ford Motor Company: Going further… 
slowly? 
Can the old dog learn new tricks? 
• We initiate the coverage of Ford Motor Company 
(NYSE: $F) with a ‘Hold’ rating and a price target 
of $9.22 for the end of FY 2021. 
• Continued strength in the pick-up truck and SUV 
segment in North America is cancelled out by 
sluggish progress on EVs. 
• Strong liquidity position (~$25B) means the 
company is well positioned for all its operational, 
investment and financing needs. 
• Projected 5y revenue CAGR is 1.61% on the back 
of 3% annual improvement in revenue per vehicle 
in the U.S. 
• Annual market share loss is set to slow down to 
1.05% in America and 2.55% in Europe due to 
introduction of hybrid and electric versions of 
popular models. 
• Long-term top-line growth rate will tend towards 
industry average of ~2%. 
• DCF valuation with a WACC of 5.33% yields a 
price of $9.32/share, while the Black-Scholes 
model gives us a value of $16.20/share and 
valuation using the EV/EBITA multiple leads to a 
price of $2.15/share. 




Previous recommendation - 
Price target for FY 2021 ($) 9.22 
Previous target - 
Price as of 30/12/2020 ($) 8.86 
Upside/downside +4.06% 
52-week range ($) 3.96 to 9.57 
Market cap ($ billion) 35.19 
Shares outstanding (billion) 3.90 
 
    
($ million) 2021 2022E 2023E 
Revenues 153650 155249 157313 
Costs 144778 145692 146663 
EBITA 8871 9557 10650 
% 5.77 6.16 6.76 
Net profit 2582 3124 3987 
ROIC (%) 2.27 4.36 4.73 
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1 Executive summary 
 
Ford Motor Company is in a precarious situation right now. One on 
hand, it is facing a massive headwind in the form of an aggressive 
industry-wide push towards electrification which challenges the firm’s 
core business model that it has worked so hard to perfect over the past 
several decades. On the other, it is also benefitting from a significant 
tailwind in the form of continued robust demand of its current ICE-based 
bestsellers, particularly its pick-up trucks in the U.S. Even on a 
macroscopic scale, things are finely poised as a record shock demand-
side shock has prompted governments towards record monetary and 
fiscal stimulus. 
The company also appointed a new CEO, CFO, and several other top 
executives across its corporate structure in October 2020 to try and 
breath fresh life into the conference room. However, the new 
management has opted to play it safe in the very short time that the 
investors have known them, which begs the question: can they really 
inspire change in this fabled, yet aging American giant? 
The answer to this question is central to any investment thesis revolving 
around Ford as the previous management was let go due to a messy and 
subpar execution of their ambitious $11B global restructuring, which 
even though now halfway through, was failing to produce tangible 
results. One of its biggest failings was Ford’s sluggish pace in 
reallocating resources towards electric vehicles.  
Turning our attention to the current situation, Ford recently relaunched 
a modern take on its iconic Bronco line. It also finally launched its first 
plug-in electric SUV, Mustang Mach-E, earlier this year, and hybrid and 
electric versions of its bestseller pick-up truck, F-150 are set to go on 
sale in 2020H2. The customer’s reception to these products will play a 
large part in determining Ford’s future. 
Thus, keeping in mind the several opposing forces and unknown 
variables at play here, we suggest that investors hold off from taking any 









2 A brief history and introduction: An aging 
giant 
 
Ford Motor Co. was founded by Henry Ford in 1903 in Michigan, 
United    States. It pioneered the automobile industry in the 20th century 
by introducing the assembly-line which allowed automobile 
manufacturers to mass-produce vehicles to meet the increasing demand. 
It manufactures a wide array of vehicles including sedans, SUVs, trucks, 
and other off-road vehicles, commercial vehicles, etc. It also has a 
financing business that provides credit to various stakeholders in the 
value chain such as dealers and customers. 
With a revenue of $156 billion in 2019, Ford is the world’s 4th largest 
automaker and the largest in the U.S. It was one of the most profitable 
companies in its first 100 years of existence but has been a shadow of 
its former self for almost 2 decades due to losing market share both in 
the U.S. and the rest of the world.  
 
2.1 Business model 
 
Ford’s most important market is the U.S.A., which accounted for almost 
40% of its total global vehicles sales in 2019. The E.U. is the company’s 
2nd largest market, although it has been steadily losing steam there too. 
Its presence in emerging markets such as Asia and Latin America is a 
more complicated dynamic due to a more volatile macroeconomic 
landscape, but its performance there has also been taking a hit, arguably 
a larger one than that in the developed economies. 
While Ford offers a wide variety of vehicles, its SUVs and trucks 
continue to be its breadwinner in the U.S, as is evident by its F-150 truck, 
which has been the bestselling passenger vehicle in the country for 
almost the past 4 decades and does not seem like it will be slowing down 
anytime soon. The good news is that such larger offerings have better 
margins than its other, more compact offerings. Ford also has a presence 
in the luxury vehicle segment in form of its premium brand ‘Lincoln’ 
but it only accounts for approximately 5% of the total revenues of the 
company as of 2019.  
 
 
Figure 1: Ford’s revenue by region 2: Ford's r venue by region. 
(Various sources, 2020) 




Ford has also built up a strong lending business in the form of Ford 
Credit on the back of its vast swathes of fixed assets to go hand-in-hand 
with its main automotive business. It provides financing to several 
members of its value chain, including distributors, dealers, and retail 
customers. It finances this operation by issuing asset-backed securities 
in the bond market. It has had a very positive impact on the firm’s 
bottom line, as is evident from its performance these past 5 years where 
it has accounted for almost half of Ford’s reported operating income, 
often persisting even when the automotive arm was stumbling. 
However, by its very nature, its long-term performance is bound to 
converge to that of the manufacturing arm since it does not originate 
sales, just facilitates them. After all, not many people would consider 
buying a car just because financing it will be cheap. For the most part, 
automotive purchases represent deeply personal, long-term 
commitments, and as such the product is still the main driver here. Thus, 
any short-term outperformance of the financing arm is unlikely to persist 
into the future. 
 
2.2 A slow fall from grace: A continuous global 
decline 
 
Most of Ford’s decline over the past two decades can be attributed to a 
fall in its market share across the board, which in turn can be attributed 
to an aging line-up that lacks excitement and innovation, both in internal 
combustion engine (ICE) cars and electric vehicles (EVs) (both hybrid 
and battery-operated). The fall has been particularly pronounced in the 
emerging economies such as Asia and South America, especially due to 
regional players who specialize in catering to such markets. Its 
performance in Europe also continues to be lacklustre, in-part due to the 
sluggish macroeconomic landscape, as well as due to increasingly 
restrictive environmental regulations. Its non-commercial vehicles have 
suffered the most in the region.  
This decline is best summarized by the following table which lists the 
difference between ROIC and WACC of its main competitors, which is 
one of the best measures of a firm’s ability to create value for its 
stakeholders. The average difference between the 2 measures is -0.29%, 
which seems a bit low, but it is not unexpected given that it is one of the 
oldest, most mature sectors of the global economy with all the legacy 
players facing a raft of headwinds. Ford is no exception and seems to be 
one of the worst performers. 
 
Figure 3: Bestselling vehicles in the 
U.S. (Various sources, 2020) 





Company ROIC  Cost of 
capital 
Difference 
Ford  4.27% 4.56% -0.29% 
GM 5.88% 3.36%  2.52% 
FCA 7.84% 8.75% -0.91% 
Volkswagen 3.46% 2.72%  0.74% 
Daimler 5.05% 2.63%  2.42% 
Toyota 5.27% 1.77%  3.5% 
Table 2: Value creation by Ford and its peers. 
. 
 
2.3 Going on a diet: The $11B global restructuring 
 
The company’s previous management, which went out in October 2020, 
had shown a preference to counter this decline via a greater focus on 
improving efficiency rather than trying to tinker with its current 
offerings. To that end, it initiated a 5-year global restructuring in 2018 
– that could cost up to $11 billion – to try and mould itself into a leaner, 
more agile firm. Most of these efforts were concentrated outside the 
U.S.A, with the number of European manufacturing plants set to go from 
24 to 18. 
Globally, Ford planned to shed about 7000 jobs, with roughly a quarter 
of it being salaried positions and the bulk of the remaining cuts going to 
hourly workers. It also announced that it would phase out the slow-
selling sedans and would move approximately 90% of the North 
American vehicle line-up volume to SUVs, trucks, and commercial 
vehicles. 
It also announced plans to invest $4B in its autonomous vehicle efforts 
through 2023, including a $1B investment in Argo AI. Ford also 
reiterated its intentions to invest $11B in electrification from 2015 to 
2022 to deliver a total of 40 EV models globally. Its first major electric 
offering is Mach-E which was unveiled in the 2020H1, which boasted 
of a 300-mile range. Its other major upcoming unveil is an electric 
version of its best-selling F-series truck by mid-2022. 
It recently unveiled an electric version of its popular commercial vehicle 
‘Transit’. However, reception to it was lukewarm at best given its 
disappointing range of 120 miles, which does not seem adequate given 
its target market. The company, however, maintains that it is sufficient 
for most of its use cases. 





While the restructuring was received well by investors when it was first 
announced, it has since failed to produce much in the way of tangible 
results even after a little more than 2 years.  
Moreover, the grinding pace at which the company was pushing reforms 
due to management’s lack of impetus was also starting to irk investors, 
especially when other legacy automakers like GM were making a more 
concerted push towards electrification, as is evident by their ‘Ultima’ 
battery platform which they developed in-house and plan to use in their 
upcoming Hummer EV, an all-electric reincarnation of an iconic 
American off-roader. 
 
2.4 New blood: CXO shake-up 
 
The abovementioned concerns finally led to a change in the top 
management of the company as CEO Jim Hackett stepped down after 
being at the helm for a little more than 3 years and was replaced by Jim 
Farley, who had until then been Ford’s COO. Farley’s first action after 
coming in was replacing the CFO Tim Stone with John Lawler, who 
until then had served as Ford’s CEO of Autonomous Vehicles and VP 
of mobility partnerships. He also made several other changes to Ford’s 
senior ranks.  
The new management is said to be more focused when it comes to 
revamping the line-up and pursuing electrification, as well as delivering 
the long-promised efficiency gains by cutting costs and reallocating 
resources more aggressively.  
However, no major announcements have been made since the change 
took place and it remains to be seen if the new management chooses to 
roughly stay the course that their predecessors embarked upon or 
whether they would look to making sweeping changes. Initial comments 
to the media suggest that their priority seems to be a continued focus on 
the company’s best sellers and to not stray from the course too much. 
But their reign is still in its infancy and thus there is a lot of uncertainty 
when thinking about Ford’s future given that staying the course may not 
be the best choice given its underperformance until now. 
  




3 The current situation: Weighed down by the 
past? 
 
The current automobile industry stands at 62 million units sold down 
from 80 million in 2017. Which is approximately 22% decline in just 
two years. The industry seems to have reached a saturation point in its 
major markets, namely, the U.S.A., Europe, China, and Japan. Industry 
estimates suggest that the next growth spurt will likely be bought on by 
the introduction of more affordable electric vehicles in tandem with an 
aggressive push to set up the supporting infrastructure. 
 
3.1 Impact of COVID-19 
                                                                   
The sudden outbreak of Coronavirus pandemic bought global mobility 
at a screeching halt with international flights being cancelled and 
majority of the population put various under various restrictions to arrest 
the spread of the disease. It was feared that the automobile industry 
would be hit especially hard and these fears were realized then sales 
contracted by almost 40% q-o-q in 2020Q2. However, this drop proved 
to be an outlier and not a precursor to a longer decline as most 
automotive manufacturers bounced back strongly in Q3, with Ford 
recording a ~94% increase in sales q-o-q.  
However, we are not out of the woods yet as at the time of writing, most 
of the world is suffering from a 2nd wave of the virus, and in most cases, 
it has proven to be more devastating than the first one. However, the 
silver lining is that governments and the public are slightly better 
prepared this time. Still, several places have seen quarantines being 
reintroduced, especially in the E.U., therefore Q4 results are expected to 
be a mixed bag depending on how the pandemic shapes up as we move 
towards the new year. The biggest relief seems to be on the vaccine front 
as both Pfizer and Moderna reported very positive results on the ongoing 
clinical trials, raising hopes that long-term impact of the virus could be 
more forgiving than initially thought.  
                
3.2 The overcapacity conundrum 
 
Automotive manufactures all over the world have been racking up the 
production capacity, Since the last 5 years the average capacity  
Figure 4: Impact of the Coronavirus on 
Ford's main markets. (Various sources, 
2020) 




utilization across the companies is around 75%. Most automotive 
producers expanded their production capacity as they forecasted a 
constant increase in demand specially in the developing economies like 
China and India. However, the industry growth continues to 
underperform expectations. This is a major concern as the plants have 
high fixed cost which can only be balanced out by effective capacity 
utilization. Keeping such dynamics in mind, other manufacturers such 
as GM, Volkswagen, Peugeot, etc. and have also decided to trim 
manufacturing capacity going forward. 
The economic carnage wrought by the current pandemic could 
exacerbate the ongoing decline if the second wave continues to ravage 
through most major economies. The current situation would most likely 
force manufacturers to restructure their facilities to promote the 
increased demand for worker safety while simultaneously seeking 
flexibility so that production can be toned down if the slump persists and 
can also be ramped up reasonably quickly once the demand starts 
perking up again. 
 
3.3 Competitive analysis 
 
Ford was world’s third largest automobile company by number of 
vehicles sold with a 5.59% global market share in 2019 only lagging 
Volkswagen and Toyota. Despite losing global market share 
consistently for more than a decade, it still maintains a firm grip on its 
main market, the U.S.A.   
However, that too has been getting progressively more difficult with 
stiff competition from GM and Toyota in ICE and the hybrid market and 
Tesla in the EV market.  Toyota recently announced a new R&D 
partnership with Panasonic dedicated to battery technology. GM 
recently unveiled its new battery platform ‘Ultima’ and has also 
committed to spending $27 billion to launch 30 new EVs across the 
globe. Volkswagen and Renault have similar plans for the European 
market.   
However, a positive indication for Ford is that it has been the 4th highest 









Figure 5: Leading global automakers in 2019 by revenue. (Various sources, 2020) 
 
As stated earlier, Ford plans to shift 90% of North American line-up to 
SUVs, trucks and commercial vehicles since hatchbacks and sedans 
accounted for just 19.4% of the total sales in 2019. Rest 81.6% consists 
of trucks and SUVs. Ford’s F-series continued its dominance as it was 
the bestselling pick-up truck in the U.S. in 2019, handily beating FCA’s 
Ram by a significant margin of 262,892 units. The company also plans 
to launch a new, facelifted F-series in 2021 which should further 
consolidate its position in this segment assuming they are able to spec 
and price it competitively. 
In Europe, its second largest market, Ford continues to rely on the 
popularity of its commercial vehicles while it slowly bleeds away 
passenger vehicle market share. The company is trying to push for 
electrification here as well, especially in its bestselling commercial 
models, but the new launches have not gone that well, and details about 
other long-term plays here are scarce. Our overall outlook here is neutral 
as the gains in one category continue to cancel out the losses in the other, 
with no clear winner in sight. 
Ford also continues to struggle in developing markets like Asia as 
regional powerhouses like Suzuki, Hyundai, Toyota, Kia, etc. continue 
to claw away at its market share by undercutting its pricing and thus 
providing a better value proposition in such price-sensitive markets. 
Their dominance here is a natural result of their Asia-first legacy. A 
longer and better local track record leads to better feedback – both in 
terms of quantity and quality – over their foreign rivals, which in turn 
leads to better products and higher sales. It is a virtuous loop, aka ‘the 
flywheel effect’, the kind that Ford enjoys in its home ground, the U.S., 
with its massively popular trucks and SUVs. 
 
 




4 The future: A long road ahead? 
 
Ford’s short-term future would revolve around the fate of its $11B 
restructuring plan which in-turn will depending upon how well Ford can 
streamline their operations. Its long-term future will be determined by 
its ability to produce compelling offering in the EV segment and how 
well it is able to arrest its decline in its leading markets. 
  
4.1 Is Ford running out of ‘gas’? 
 
4.1.1 A look at Ford’s current product mix 
 
Due to the combination of an absence of any battery-electric vehicle and 
the lack of popularity of its hybrid line-up, Ford continues to rely on its 
legacy ICE offerings for almost all its automotive revenues. Digging a 
little deeper, we find out that most of it comes from the large passenger 
vehicle segment, which consists of pick-up trucks and SUVs. Light 
vehicles, which includes sedans, hatchbacks, etc., account for only a 
small portion of the pie. 
 
As we can see, in 2019, Ford’s massive truck sales, which accounted for 
53.31% of its U.S. wholesales, can be attributed to the continued 
dominance of its F-150 model, which has been the bestselling passenger 
vehicle in U.S.A. on and off for almost the last four decades. SUVs were 
second in line with a wholesale share of 33.87%, with smaller cars 
accounting for a measly 12.82%. 
The continued popularity of the SUVs and pick-up trucks in both its 
major markets, but especially in the U.S.A. has ensured that despite the 
ever-increasing competition and a lack of compelling electric and hybrid 
options, Ford continues to pump out reasonably good sales figures year 
over year.  
Table 3: Ford's sales by vehicle type. 
Figure 6: Bestselling passenger vehicles 
in the U.S. (Various sources, 2020) 




In the following section, we will look at the SUV market in Ford’s 
biggest target geographies. A similar analysis of pick-up trucks, which 
account for a larger share of Ford’s revenues, would be much less useful 
given that they are a predominantly American phenomenon and the F-
150’s sales are projected to largely follow its historical trend given the 
continuous appetite displayed for it by its consumer base. 
 
 
Figure 7: U.S. light vehicle sales by segment. (Various sources, 2020) 
 
The persistence of this dynamic is best captured by the above 
infographic, which shows the demand in the U.S. light vehicles market 
by segment between April 2019 and April 2020. The two things that 
jump out when we look at it are:  
• It shows us that pick-up trucks were the second most popular 
segment.  
• While most other segments saw a contraction, the demand for 
pick-up trucks grew from 16.4% to 20%, which is an annual 
growth of almost 22%. For comparison, crossovers, which is the 
largest segment, grew from 39.5% to 40.8%, which is a growth 
of just 3.29% over the year. 
 
The 2020Q3 results reinforce this notion as pick-up truck sales growth 
somehow managed to stay positive despite an unprecedented 
macroeconomic shock. The contraction in all other segments is much 
more in line with expectation. The fall is precipitous in the smaller cars 
segment, which also lends credibility to Ford’s decision to move most 
of its North American volumes to its larger offerings. 
  





Table 4: Ford’s Q3 2020 sales in U.S. by segment. 
 
Thus, it would not be unreasonable to assume that this segment will 
continue to perform well for Ford, especially with the recent launch of 
the facelifted F-150 and its upcoming hybrid and battery-electric 
versions which are set to go on sale by the second half of 2022. 
 
4.1.2 The SUV market 
 
The robust demand for SUVs is personified by the following infographic 
which compares the share of SUVs in new vehicle sales amongst the 
three largest automotive markets in the world, the U.S.A, the E.U. and 
China.  
Figure 7 implies that SUV’s share in new vehicles grew at a CAGR of 
7.46% in the U.S., 14.72% in Europe and 16.10% in China, all of which 
are leaps and bounds ahead of the 1.5% to 2.5% historical annual growth 
of the global automotive market.  
To try and provide greater context to these growth rates, the following 
graph details the light vehicle sales worldwide between January and 
June of 2019 by segment.  
 
 
Figure 9: Worldwide light vehicle sales by segment. (Various sources, 2020) 
 
Figure 8: SUVs as % of total new vehicles 
sales. (Various sources, 2020) 




As we can see, 1 in every 3 cars sold worldwide in those six months was 
an SUV, and it does not seem like the trend is going away soon, with 
sales worldwide projected to go from 26.7M in 2017 to 51M in 2023, a 
CAGR of 11.39%. However, these estimates were made in the pre-
pandemic era, and the realized growth over the next 5-6 years will most 
likely be lower than them. The magnitude of difference is extremely 
difficult to forecast given the sheer number of independent variables at 
play, but even the most conservative measures would still portray that 
this segment’s growth will easily outpace that of the larger market, even 
in case of an overall contraction. 
Despite Ford’s prowess in this uber popular segment, we must keep in 
mind the highly skewed nature of its revenues, with almost three 
quarters of it coming from the U.S. Thus, if we take a step back and 
assess the aggregate SUV sales in all major geographies, we will see that 
Ford still lags the likes of Toyota, Nissan, Honda, etc. by a significant 
margin. The following figure segments the global SUV sales data (in 
thousands) for 2018 by major brands.  
 
 
As we can see, Toyota sold almost 45% more SUVs globally than Ford, 
and most of this outperformance can be attributed to its larger scale and 
a relatively more egalitarian split of sales across different geographies. 
The extent of Ford’s geographic skew is made clearer when we consider 
the fact that none of its SUVs made it into the global 10 bestsellers list 
in 2019. 
  
Figure 10: Global SUV sales by company (in thousands). (Various sources, 2020) 




4.1.3 Implications for key value drivers 
 
From an investor’s point of view, given the high geographical skew of 
Ford’s sales, its performance in the North America and the Europe will 
determine its fate going forward.  
Its position in the North American market is quite unique. While its 
failure to pursue electrification more aggressively should have a bigger 
impact on its sales numbers going forward, at least when viewed in 
isolation, the fact that its current ICE-based bestsellers align so well with 
the existing consumer psychology in its main market (U.S., with ~70% 
revenues) means that the overall impact of their inaction elsewhere is 
mitigated to a large extent. 
However, given the company’s sales figures over the past 5 years, the 
trend overall has still been a consistent erosion of market share with an 
average annual loss of ~1.45% in the U.S.  
Despite this bleed, Ford’s North American revenues have still been 
creeping up with a 5y CAGR of 1.30%. The two main reasons for this 
disparity are: - 
• First, larger vehicles tend to command higher prices and are more 
profitable than smaller vehicles, both across and within vehicle 
segments. Specifically, in North America, the company’s larger, 
more profitable vehicles had an average contribution margin that 
was about 130% of its total average contribution margin across all 
vehicles, whereas its smaller vehicles had significantly lower 
contribution margins. 
• Second, despite an overall decline in business due to a mix of 
product and market headwinds, the company continues to gain 
efficiency in its manufacturing process, as is evident by its revenue 
per vehicle growing by a 5y CAGR of ~4.40%. 
Given the prevailing market conditions, including both the product and 
geographic mix, we predict that Ford will continue to lose market share 
in North America, albeit at a lower rate for ~1.20%, at least until 2024, 




Table 5: Ford's North America market share and growth. 




Our rationale behind this improvement is that its current offerings will 
enjoy a slight boost in popularity over this period owing to the interest 
rate and oil price tailwinds, which should make purchasing and 
operating new vehicles slightly cheaper for the end user.  
The loss of market share should slow down further to ~1.05% after 2024, 
which is a further improvement of almost 15%, as the electric and hybrid 
versions of its popular trucks and SUV’s become more commonplace.  
The reason we forecast an overall decline despite such developments is 
our view that Ford’s main competitors such as GM, Toyota, etc. are 
making faster progress on this front and other promising ventures such 
as Rivian have also had a head-start in making large, plug-in electric 
vehicles. 
Thus, Ford’s ICE sales in North America will continue to be the driving 
force for the company for the short- to medium-term despite any 
developments in the rest of the company’s markets. 
We avoided forecasting things beyond 2026 since we do not think a 
reasonable estimate can be made of the industry dynamics by that point. 
A lot is happening across the cross section of legacy and new 
automakers and it is very difficult to foresee major technological 
developments that will drive the industry in the long-term.  
In our forecast, the company would reach a relatively stable state by 
2026. By then, it would have consolidated its line-up towards its 
bestselling vehicles, the majority of which would still be ICE-powered. 
This trend will likely persist until at least the end of the decade, i.e., until 
2030, and may even survive past that. But given the current pace of 
technological and regulatory changes, we did not forecast things that far. 
The company’s future in Europe would likely follow a similar path, 
although its dominance here is mainly in commercial vehicles like the 
‘Transit’, which makes forecasts a bit more difficult given the logistical 
preferences of businesses are not as sticky or easy to gauge.  
 
 
Table 6: Ford’s Q3 2020 sales in Europe by segment. 
 




The above results paint a mixed picture as gains in commercial vehicles 
are wiped by the losses in passenger vehicle sales. The lukewarm 
response to the recent launch of ‘E-Transit’ also casts a shadow on the 
demand of Ford’s commercial vehicles on the continent. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that it is just the first generation of the vehicle, 
and future iterations would likely boast of better capabilities. 
The bad news here is that the E.U. does not have nearly the same volume 
of demand for any of the company’s passenger vehicles, so the balancing 




The above dynamics, combined with the fact that Ford has been losing 
market share in Europe at an average of 3% annually over the past 5 
years, leads us to believe that the firm will see a marginally lower market 
share bleed of 2.75% till 2024, a ~8.5% improvement over its current 
conditions. 
We foresee it falling further to ~2.55% by 2026 given the expectation of 
iterative improvements in the commercial vehicles segment and a 
further consolidation in the passenger vehicles segment. It is also likely 
that ICE commercial vehicles will play a larger role for Ford in the EU 
than in North America, despite stricter regulations, due to much lower 
demand of its largest passenger vehicles. 
 
4.2 EVs: Looking for a ‘charger’. 
 
We had mentioned earlier in the report how EVs are poised to be the 
biggest growth driver of the automobile industry and are set to largely 
replace ICE vehicles within in the next 10-20 years.  
The segment is still in its nascent phase but just like every other industry 
a head start in R&D and innovation in the early stages gives an edge to 
the companies and they reap the ensuing competitive advantage for 
several years.  Ford has been torpid in its EV approach. It only recently 
launched its first plug-in EV (the Mach-E) and has just 4 hybrid vehicles  
Table 7: Ford's European market share and growth. 




in its lineup, all of which failed to compete with the likes of Tesla in the 
U.S., BYD in China and Toyota, BMW, Renault in Europe. 
Ford’s hybrid EV sales only constitute 0.38% of the total vehicles sold 
globally in 2019. It has the worst EV to total vehicles sold ratio among 
the 10 biggest automobile companies in this world.  
Ford’s and other U.S. automaker’s lethargic approach towards EVs 
allowed Tesla to gain a market share of 81.6% in the segment as of 2019. 
It would be extremely difficult for Ford to claw back a piece from 
Tesla’s pie as it is years behind it in terms of technology. 
Ford’s focus on its ICE segment will probably be good for the 
company’s bottom line in the short- to medium-term, but the high 
opportunity cost is bound to catch up to them in the long-term in the 
form of lower future EV sales. EVs are expected to account for 10% of 
global automobile sales by 2026. According to our estimates, Ford has 
planned to launch roughly 40 EVs globally over the next 5-10 years, 
including an ecosystem of electric commercial vehicles. However, only 
3 have been confirmed so far. Thus, taking the current pace of 
development into account, we have estimated that it will sell around 
200,000 EVs globally by 2026, which would account for just ~4.5% of 
its sales by volume. This is quite low compared to the projected industry 
average of 10%.  
Ford’s projections being on the lower end of the spectrum for 2026 
imply that they are underprepared and will likely continue to trail the 
larger plug-in market even until the end of decade, 2030, when EVs are 
expected to make up almost 28% of the global automotive sales. 
Ford’s new CEO, Jim Farley, has admitted that Ford is still taking baby 
steps in the EV market, but has committed that market should expect a 
quick turnaround from the company given its historic R&D and financial 
prowess. 
He also helmed the launch of Ford’s first ever plug-in SUV, the Mustang 
Mach-E, which was announced under his predecessor, but saw a 
renewed focus under current management. It is set to compete against 
the likes of Tesla Model Y, Audi E-Tron, Volvo Polestar 2, etc.  
The good news here is that despite the being late to the game, Ford hasn’t 
come empty handed as Mach-E looks to be competitively specced and 
priced with a 300-mile range for its mid-tier, $50,000 model. This pits 
it directly against the segment leader, Tesla’s Model Y, which boasts of 
a 325-mile range at an identical price. Given the competition’s slightly 
better range, superior technology and much more favorable brand 
perception, Ford will have to really go all out on the Mach-E’s marketing  




efforts to start clawing back a reasonable share of the market. It’s 
success with this platform will give investors important clues regarding 
the company’s future in this critical segment.  
 
4.2.1 Forecasting Mustang Mach-E’s sales 
 
The Mach-E deliveries are poised to start around the New Year’s Eve. 
Ford expects to produce 50,000 units in 2021 with an average retail price 
of ~$50,000. The initial reaction to the launch has largely been positive 
with both journalists and prospective customers praising Ford’s design 
choices and pricing. 
According to the pre-booking data, Ford has already received 41,000 
reservations. They expect the remaining units to be booked soon, 
probably by the end of 2021Q2. Historically, 70% people who make a 
reservation end up buying the car. However, given the positive 
reception, Ford has little worries about selling all its units.  
 
Vehicles sold Average price Revenue ($ million) 
50,000 50,000 2500 
Table 8: Mach-E's expected sales for 2021. 
 
The forecasted revenue for this vehicle is $2500M for 2021, which 
would be 2.1% of their total annual sales. However, the catch here is that 
Ford is likely to make a loss on this model due to higher fixed costs and 
minimal economies of scale associated with transitioning to a 
completely new platform, drivetrain, and manufacturing process. 
Moreover, the selling, general and administrative expenses would also 
be also slightly higher due to the required retraining of factory floor 
workers. Keeping all this in mind, the operating margin on this launch 
will initially be a measly 1.50% to 2.00%. 
Another important point is that due to rapid technological changes, the 
operating margins on EVs is nowhere near steady state and will remain 
quite unpredictable for quite some time. Ford expects the current pace 
of development to lead to a 10% to 20% reduction in prices of Mach-E 
over the next couple of years with the fierce competition in the segment 
consistently challenging margin expansion.  




Keeping in mind all these dynamics at play here, it is our view that the 
Mach-E’s sales will not have any material impact on Ford’s bottom line 
for the foreseeable future. For the EVs to start making a dent, Ford will 
have to scale up its current offerings a lot, and fast. The sooner it does 
this, the sooner it can start benefitting from the improving economies of 
scale. Nonetheless, this is still a promising start as 50,000 units is a 
reasonably good industry figure for a first foray into plug-in vehicles. 
Ford’s priority now should be a comprehensive follow up after its 
promising debut by aggressively pursuing R&D in the field, especially 
in battery technology as that is one of the biggest hurdles to mass 
adoption of the platform. Launching a few more EVs would just not cut 
it. Other than the traditional OEMs, it is competing against cutting edge 
startups like Nio, Rivian, Xiapeng, Faraday, etc., and lot of them are 
backed by large VCs with deep pockets and are laser-focused on this 
platform and its intricacies. 
There is a possibility that Ford could explore acquiring any such 
promising EV startup since it could be a good way to make up for its 
sluggish pace until now. In such a case, the valuation metrics for Ford’s 
EV portfolio could be quite different from their current state. However, 
given the bubble-like craze in the EV-related SPAC market right now, 
Ford will likely have to pay through its nose for any such acquisition, 
which likely means little to no value-add, if at all, in the long-term.  
Moreover, it already bought a minor stake in Rivian for $500 million 
and apparently has planned to use its technology for its luxury brand, 
Lincoln, to launch an EV by 2021. But that project has been put on the 
hold this year and the vehicle would not be launched until at least 2023. 
Other details about this partnership remain scarce and its ultimate 
contribution to Ford’s bottom line remains to be seen. Thus, our 
assumption here is that no major acquisitions will be made, and all of 
Ford’s EV-related R&D will continue to be done in-house. 
 
4.2.2 Impact on valuation  
 
All in all, while the Mach-E looks promising, the overall future of the 
company in this segment is still quite uncertain. While Ford is quick to 
push out statements to shareholders regarding its plans about EVs, those 
statements are seldom followed by timely, orderly action. This is the 
reason why we chose to segment our revenue forecast by geography 
instead of drivetrain. However, our growth rates still implicitly account 
for our view of Ford’s future in the EV segment in each of its major  
Figure 11: Biggest investment in EVs by 
manufacturers. (Various sources, 2020) 




geographical market. EVs will play the biggest role in North America, 
then in Europe, and then finally in China. Their impact in Ford’s other 
market will likely be immaterial in the long-run due to their economic 
make-up and their miniscule contribution to Ford’s current sales.   
Our approach would have been different if Ford had a concrete roadmap 
for EVs which it faithfully followed and thus had some positive results 
to show for itself. In that case, EVs would have a higher % in the total 
sales and maybe its long-term growth rate would have been above the 
industry average. 
 
5  Valuation 
 
Our core thesis with Ford is that the status quo will persist going forward 
as the company’s demonstrated lack of urgency – whether it involves 
shedding excess fat or aggressively pursuing new growth avenues – is 
balanced out by the continued popularity of its bestsellers, specifically 
its SUVs, trucks, and commercial vehicles. 
The infancy of the new management throws a wrench in our work as 
there is a marked lack of official communication regarding their long-
term plans for the company. The earliest anyone can expect such 
information to be made public in any appreciable detail is in the next 
annual shareholder’s report, which should shed further light on the fate 
of the $11B restructuring initiated by their predecessors as well as any 
new ideas they might have of their own. Their comments to the media 
up until the writing of this report have been generic with no major 
change of course and/or policy communicated yet.  
However, our job as analysts and potential investors is to make-do the 
best, we can with what we are given.  
Thus, while it would be ill-advised to read too much into what the new 
management says or does since it is still very early days, any reasonable 
investment analysis will still have to err on the side of caution by 
maintaining a margin of safety in the forecasts, as the first rule of 
investing is to avoid losing money. We have attempted to do that by 
assuming that the overall condition of the company will see minimal 
change going forward, which means that the current market dynamics 
will continue to work against the company ethos and their pace of 
adaptation will be mediocre at best.  
 




This view is given further credence by a couple of factors, the first of 
which is that the company has announced just 3 EVs that are scheduled 
to come out by 2022, which is a tiny fraction of their initial target of 40 
new models that they set up in 2015. The lack of promising new 
initiatives as well of follow-up on previous announcements does not 
bode well for the future. The second factor, and this may be a bit more 
controversial, is the lack of urgency communicated by the new 
management, instead preferring to regurgitate what their predecessors 
had claimed. The asterisk here is that it is still extremely early to make 
such claims, but our view is that any management bought in to arrest a 
declining business must be more aggressive with their communication 
and actions than people would generally expect. 
If things were not that bad, they would not have been brought in in the 
first place, and thus we feel it is important to own up to the firm’s past 
shortcomings more readily and publicly, which the new management 
has thus far failed to do. 
 




At the time of writing this report, Ford is delicately balanced between 
two opposing, secular trends. The first is the urgent need to push for 
greater electrification of the line-up, which the firm has so far failed to 
do, and the other is the consistent demand for its large form factor 
passenger vehicles such as SUVs and trucks worldwide, which Ford is 
a market leader in. Thus, while the long-term performance of the 
company is likely to suffer from a lack of EV offerings if they do not 
change course or at least shift gears, its short- and medium-term future 
seem relatively safe given the continuous demand for its bestsellers, the 
electric versions of which have already been announced and are 
scheduled to roll-out within the next 1-2 years, which should provide 
some long-term support to top-line growth. 
While the above may be a more bottom-up approach towards predicting 
aggregate demand, even the top-down approach seems finely poised 
between two opposing macroeconomic forces. The first is the economic 
damage bought forth by the ongoing pandemic, which seems likely to 
continue until a vaccine reaches enough penetration to spur herd 
immunity, which could take anywhere from 6 months to 18 months. 
Counteracting this record demand-side shock is also a record supply- 




side policy response in the form of an extremely low interest rate 
environment in most major economies, as well as a first of its kind direct 
stimulus payment to citizens in countries like U.S. and Germany, etc. 
This has given a boost to aggregate savings across the economy, which 
means that the pent-up demand could turn out to be significant when 
things do start opening back up. Oil prices have also taken a significant 
hit, which means that not only is it easier to finance a new purchase, but 
it will also be cheaper to operate it going forward.  
Keeping everything in mind, we decided to combine both the 
abovementioned approaches when forecasting Ford’s revenues. The top-
down view is accommodated using 2 independent variables: total market 
size and Ford’s market share. The bottom-up view is considered by 
including Ford’s revenue per vehicle, which helps us in capturing the 
company’s evolving product mix and its impact of their revenue profile 
across all its geographical markets, namely North America, Europe, 
China, South America, Asia Pacific and Middle East & Africa. 
The value drivers work as stated below: - 
Revenue = Vehicles sold * revenue per vehicle (RPV) 
Where, vehicles sold = Total market size * market share. 
 
 
Table 9: Forecasting Ford's North American revenues till 2026. 
 
Since Ford currently derives more than 90% of its revenues from North 
America (~70%) and Europe (~20%), we decided to concentrate on 
these two regions.  
We forecast that Ford will continue to shed market share in all 
geographies, but the rate at which it will occur would be slower than the 
preceding 5 years (-1.14% vs. -1.50% in North America and -2.67% vs 
-3.53% in Europe). This will be due to the respectable sales of its trucks 
and SUVs in the former and of its commercial vehicles in the latter, and 
in part due to the much-anticipated launches of the Ford Bronco, 
Mustang Mach-E and the electric F-150 in 2022, all of which cater to 
the same, wildly popular segment. The decline in market share tapers 
off towards the end of the forecast in all its geographical markets (- 




1.05% vs -1.20% for North America and -2.55% vs. -2.75% for Europe) 
as the company will be able to introduce new EVs by 2026. Although 
these launches will be mostly behind schedule, they should nonetheless 
offer customers a compelling choice going forward, especially if the 
Mach-E’s 300-mile range is anything to go by. 
Additionally, incremental retooling of several existing facilities means 
that the company will be increasingly able to harvest economies of scale 
going forward, which should ensure competitive pricing in most of its 
electric offerings. This is accounted for through an increase in revenue 
per vehicle over time in most of its geographical markets (3.00% for 
North America and 1.50% for Europe, which have both been kept 
slightly below their historical averages to maintain a margin of safety in 
the forecasts). These rates have also implicit in them our low expected 
inflation in both the regions. 
In China, we expect Ford’s total market share to contract by almost 50% 
in 6 years, from 1.96% in 2020 to 0.94% in 2026. This can mainly be 
attributed to its fierce competition with well-funded regional players 
such as Nio, Xpeng, etc., which in-turn may partially stem from the 
questionable intellectual property practices of the region. The higher 
growth, at 4.5%, reflects an elevated exchange rate and tariff-related 
risks.  
Ford is also cutting back its business in South America. This is reflected 
by an annual loss of market share of ~6% and a 3.2% contraction in RPV 
until 2026. 
Asia Pacific also presents a similar story with Ford struggling against 
strong regional players. We expect its market share to go down from 
1.36% in 2021 to 0.82% in 2026, with a relatively higher RPV growth 
of 6.50% keeping in mind the larger vehicles on offer as well as higher 
expected inflation in the region. 
Lastly, Middle East and Africa, which accounts for ~1% of Ford’s sales, 
will see an average annual market share loss of 6.55% and an annual 




Given our assumption that the current market dynamics will largely 
persist going forward, we expect minimal change in most of Ford’s cost 
structure going forward. 
 




The biggest change here is a roughly 15% decline in sales, general & 
administrative (SG&A) costs over 5 years, from 7.75% in 2021 to 6.75% 
of total Automotive and Mobility (A&M) revenue in 2026. This can be 
attributed to Ford’s planned white collar layoffs as well as its plans to 
reduce its number of manufacturing facilities in Europe from 24 to 18.  
The cost of goods sold will also see a marginal reduction from the long-
term average of 90.70% to 89.50% as shedding excess capacity would 
lead to marginally more cost-effective utilization of current resources, 
including both labor and equipment.  
These effects may seem suppressed to the reader given the magnitude of 
change that Ford is trying to implement. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that it is not just a simple contraction of the asset and labor 
bases. It will also involve investments into retooling the remaining 
manufacturing facilities as well as retraining a noticeable portion of the 
assembly line workforce to cater to the increasing EV volumes. 
We do not foresee any major changes to the cost structure of Ford Credit 
since it is a relatively well-oiled machine and thus it would not make 
sense to try to change things too much. 
 
5.2 Balance sheet trends 
 
We forecast minimal overall change in the balance sheet structure, with 
most ratios remaining roughly equivalent to their 5-year trailing 
averages, including both working capital and long-term assets and 
liabilities. However, as expected, Ford’s fixed assets are set to see a 
slight decline due to its ongoing attempts to reorganize its supply chain 
in Europe. 
 
5.2.1 Property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) 
 
We forecast that Ford’s PP&E will go down 7% from its long-term 
average of 23.63% of its revenue to 22% over the next 5 years due to 
disposing off 6 – or 25% – of its manufacturing facilities in Europe under 
its current restructuring plan. 
As stated earlier, the figure could have fallen further if the cuts were 
done in isolation, but the need for reallocating resources towards 
producing electric vehicles puts an opposing, expansionary pressure on 
its manufacturing asset base. 




5.3 Capital structure 
 
We do not foresee Ford making any meaningful additions to its debt 
burden within the forecast period due to already having plenty of 
liquidity – worth more than $25B – at hand. It should be sufficient for 
all its current as well as planned operational, investing and financing 
needs. 
The significant pre-existing debt burden and the surrounding 
macroeconomic uncertainty will most likely weigh heavily on the 
management’s mind if and when they think about making material, 
additional borrowings. 
Also, given the longevity of the business and the subsequent investor 
expectations that have been shaped by it over decades, we also forecast 
the payout ratio to stay as it is, which currently stands at a relatively 
consistent 66%. The strong signaling effect that entails from any 
reduction in dividends gives us confidence in our forecast. 
Thus, we can say that Ford’s maturity lends itself to a relatively stable 
capital structure despite any operational transformation that the business 
may be trying to accomplish internally. 
 
5.3.1 Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
 
We first used the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) to obtain Ford’s 
cost of equity. 
We used two methods to calculate Ford’s levered beta, the first was by 
regressing Ford’s stock returns with the S&P 500’s return for the past 
decade. A weekly frequency was chosen for the data points as our 
research showed that it produced the cleanest regression by avoiding the 
noise associated with daily data while also avoiding the loss of 
information incurred by choosing longer return frequencies. This gave 
us a beta of 1.315.  
The second method we used was computing Ford’s beta through 
comparable companies. This was done to triangulate the results of the 
regression by gaining an alternative perspective on the stock and the 
underlying asset’s market risk. The companies included in the analyses 
were General Motors, Fiat-Chrysler Automobiles, Volkswagen, 
Daimler and Toyota, all mature, global auto manufacturers. The analysis 
yielded a beta of 2.16. 




The difference in both the estimates is quite significant. After further 
researching this anomaly, we hypothesize that the ongoing crises affects 
the comparable firm analysis much more than it does the regression. 
This in turn can be attributed to the former’s reliance on current market 
values of equity and debt and the latter’s longer window (10 years) of 
analysis. Therefore, it is our view that the regression beta is a more 
accurate portrayal of Ford’s long-term undiversifiable risk, and thus that 
is the one we have used in our analysis. 
The equity risk premium (ERP) was taken from Professor Damodaran’s 
website (Damodaran, Country Default Spreads and Risk Premiums, 
2020), which is a highly respected source used widely by academics and 
practitioners alike. He computes it by first obtaining a country’s default 
spread through a mixture of its sovereign credit rating and CDS spread 
over the U.S., which is then multiplied by the ratio of volatility of the 
country’s equity and bond indices to get a country risk premium, which 
is finally added to the mature market risk premium, which corresponds 
to the implied premium for the S&P500 of 5.23% (as of July 2020).  
ERP = mature market risk premium + country risk premium 
Since Ford is a U.S. based enterprise, the country risk premium = 0, 
hence, ERP = mature market risk premium + 0 = 5.23%. 
Using the 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds rate of 0.867% as the risk-free 
rate, we get a cost of equity of 7.75%. 
For calculating Ford’s cost of debt, we referred to the current yield to 
maturity (YTM) of its 10-year bonds, which is ~4.85% (via Bloomberg 
Terminal), as well its annualized default rate (ADR) of 0.65% and loss-
given-default (LGD) of 30% associated with its credit rating of BB+ (via 
S&P), which is just one notch below investment-grade. Both figures 
were taken from (Kraemer, 2020). 
Cost of debt = YTM – (ADR*LGD) 
This gave us a cost of debt of 4.65%. Finally, using Ford’s debt-to-equity 
ratio of 3.47 gave us a WACC of 5.34%. 
 
5.4 DCF valuation 
 
Using the aforementioned figure yields a final share price of $9.32 
(basic) and $9.25 (diluted) as of end of FY 2021, which is 5.19% higher 
than Ford’s current share price of $8.86. 





Table 10: DCF valuation for Ford Motor Co. as of end of FY2021.  
 
Where the perpetual growth rate, g = ROICt-1*RR = 5.89% * 35.73% = 
2.10% (all figures as of 2026), which is well within the global 
automotive industry’s long-term annualized growth rate of 1.5% to 
2.5%. 
 
5.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Our sensitivity analysis was done considering asymmetric scenarios. 
Instead of considering the possible upside and downside to be equal in 
magnitude, our range of expectations spanned from a 75% downside to 
a 25% upside to the forecasted perpetual growth rate of 2.10%. This 
unconventional approach was taken keeping in mind the fragility of 
Ford’s current situation vis-à-vis the ongoing business transformation 




Table 11: Analysis of our DCF valuation's sensitivity to the perpetual growth rate, g. 
 
DCF valuation
($ million) 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Free cash flow (9414) 8664 9310 7436 6584
Discount factor 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.81 0.77
PV of FCF (8937) 7809 7966 6040 5078
Continuing value 208169
PV of continuing value 160540
Operating value 178496




Less: Post-retirement obligations (19096)
Value of equity 37017
Price per share, basic ($) 9.32
Price per share, diluted ($) 9.25
For the years ended December 31,




As expected, the broader-than-expected range of inputs results in a 
broader-than-expected range of outputs. The most striking result of this 
analysis is the fact that even though all growth rates in the table are 
positive, the company is only better off than the base case in a small 
fraction of the scenarios. A 37.5% reduction in perpetual growth, which 
would still be a respectable 1.32%, will push the value of Ford’s equity 
towards 0. This highlights the risk that the asset-heavy behemoth faces 
in creating value for shareholders in the future. They need to innovate, 
and they need to do it fast. Otherwise, the slow, downward trajectory 
that the firm has been on for the past decade will eventually pose a 
credible threat to its solvency.  
The good news is that the overall results are still positively skewed as 
only a 12.5% increase in the perpetual growth rate to 2.37% is enough 
to unlock the way towards a ~40% upside with a price per share of 
$12.82. 
 
5.5 The Black-Scholes model: Valuing equity as an 
option 
 
Given the unique combination of a business facing major industrial 
headwinds, a generational economic shock and the high level of 
financial leverage involved, we thought it would be interesting to value 
Ford’s equity as a derivative, specifically a call option, using the Black-
Scholes model.  
This method is useful when analyzing firms that are struggling and are 
in a distress or near-distress state (Damodaran, Investment Valuation: 
Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset, 2012). 
The reasoning is that the underlying asset in this case is the enterprise 
value of the firm computed using a DCF and the strike price is the face 
value of the firm’s outstanding debt. A distress/near-distress state means 
that the value of the asset (in this case, Ford Motor Co.) is not too far 
from the strike price (Ford’s total financial obligations), and therefore 
the equity can be reasonably valued as a call. It is crucial that both these 
numbers are reasonably close to each other. This is not the case when 
the firm in question is well run and their enterprise value far outweighs 
their total debt burden. In such cases, the total value of the underlying 
assets is too far away from the strike price for the model to be of any 
practical use as it would be equivalent to calculating the value of an 
absurdly far-OTM option. 
 




The duration of the call in this case was the face value weighted average 
duration of Ford’s outstanding bond issues, and the variance of the 
underlying asset was taken from (Damodaran, Standard Deviations by 
Sector (U.S.), 2020). 
 
 
Table 12: Calculating the maturity of the call. 
 
 
Table 13: Final inputs into the Black-Scholes model. 
 
The above inputs result in an equity value of $63.799B, which translates 
to a basic price per share of $16.06 which drops down marginally to 
$15.93 when accounting for full dilution. These values are roughly 75% 
higher than the current market price and ones yielded by our DCF 
valuation.  
When thinking about the reasons behind such a big difference, it is 
important to keep in mind the underlying mechanics at play here. First, 
the outputs of these two models are not independent as the DCF 
valuation is one of the inputs into the option valuation. Second, the 
Black-Scholes model makes certain assumptions about the prices 
(normally distributed), returns (lognormally distributed) and volatility 
(constant for the duration of the option) in the market, all of which make 
more sense when looking at the aggregate behaviour of the market but 
do not necessarily reflect adequately the nuances of every individual 
business and security. This lack of specificity is why the output of the 
Black-Scholes model here should be taken with a healthy dose of 
skepticism. It is, instead, best viewed as representing a right-tail 
outcome for the company. 
  




5.6 Valuation using EV/EBITA multiple 
 
To gain a more market-based perspective on Ford with respect to its 
peers, we valued it using the EV/EBITA multiples. On our choice of 
multiple, from (McKinsey & Company, 2015): - 
“Using enterprise value to EBITA (or NOPLAT) rather than a P/E 
eliminates the distorting effect of different capital structures, 
nonoperating assets, and nonoperating income statement items (such as 
the nonoperating portion of pension expense). Any item that isn’t a 
helpful indicator of a company’s future cash-generating ability should 
be excluded from your calculation of the multiple.” 
 
 
Table 14: Valuing Ford using EV/EBITA multiple for 2020Q3. 
 
This valuation stands firmly in contrast to the Black-Scholes one as it 
represents a left-tail outcome for the company, albeit one that is not as 
extreme as the one we considered in our sensitivity analysis during the 
DCF. However, despite having a different output, it suffers from the 
same weaknesses as that of the Black-Scholes, namely an overreliance 
on current market dynamics which in-turn reflect both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks, and it is very difficult to separate them by just 
looking at current prices. Thus, it makes sense to take this value with a 











Ford EV = Median * EBITA 122.11
Less: Debt -113.73
Equity ($ billion) 8.38
Shares outstanding (in billion) 3.90
Price per share ($) 2.15






The three valuation frameworks yield an average price of $9.22/share, 
which is very close to the DCF valuation of $9.32/share. This, in our 
opinion, is a good sign, as it reflects the versatility of the intrinsic 
valuation methods and all the scenarios that they implicitly account for.  
The proximity of these two figures means that our overall assumptions 
about Ford are reasonable and thus the DCF valuation represents the 
most plausible base case while the other two methods are pricing in 
some kind of right and left tail events. Such scenarios, while quite 
unlikely, would most probably be spurred on by some unknown 
unknowns if they ever do materialize. Trying to attach probabilities to 
such tail events is an exercise in futility. 
Meanwhile, the sell-side analyst forecasts and ratings are (The Wall 
Street Journal, 2020): - 
Scenario High Median Low Average 
Price per share ($) 12.00 9.00 7.10 9.19 
     
Recommendations Buy Hold Sell  
No. of analysts 4 13 1  
Table 15: Sell-side analyst forecasts and ratings as of 2020Q3. 
  
This means that at the time of writing this report, most valuation 
professionals share our views as well. 
Keeping all of this in mind, our final price target for Ford is $9.22/share 
for the end of FY2021. Given it current market price of $8.86/share, this 
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Taxes
Taxes on EBITA
Provision for income taxes 2881 2184 402 650 (724) (201) 686 830 1060 1302 1459 1514
Tax shield on interest expense 1116 1297 1528 1083 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136
Tax on non-operating income (1415) (682) (1564) (498) 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Taxes on EBITA 2582 2799 366 1235 453 976 1863 2007 2236 2479 2636 2691
Reorganized income statement
EBITA 9397 8541 8056 7133 4963 4647 8871 9557 10650 11802 12551 12814
Taxes on EBITA (2582) (2799) (366) (1235) (453) (976) (1863) (2007) (2236) (2479) (2636) (2691)
Change in deferred taxes 0 1993 (933) 132 (1558) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOPLAT NOPLAT 6815 7735 6757 6030 2952 3671 7008 7550 8413 9324 9915 10123
Reconciliation with net income
Net income 7373 4589 7731 3677 47 (755) 2582 3124 3987 4898 5489 5696
Add: Increase in deferred taxes 0 1993 (933) 132 (1558) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Add: Investments after tax (1182) (1157) (781) (97) (25) (25) (25) (25) (25) (25) (25) (25)
Add: Minority interests (2) 11 26 18 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjusted net income 6189 5436 6043 3730 (1499) (781) 2557 3099 3962 4872 5464 5671
Add: Interest expense after tax 2073 2409 2837 4075 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273
Income available to investors 8262 7845 8881 7805 2774 3493 6830 7372 8235 9145 9737 9944
Less: Non-operating income after tax (1447) (110) (2124) (1775) 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
NOPLAT 6815 7735 6757 6030 2952 3671 7008 7550 8413 9324 9915 10123
Check: NOPLAT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reorganized balance sheet
Working capital 34046 35097 41326 45115 39973 39317 46081 45998 46020 46831 47826 48823
Property, plant & equipment 30163 32072 35327 36178 36469 36458 33955 32876 31863 32378 33032 33714
Other assets net of other liabilities 65121 71087 76598 76798 74331 69513 81674 81722 81816 82378 84060 85806
Invested capital Inv_Cap 129330 138256 153251 158091 150773 145288 161710 160596 159699 161587 164918 168342
Excess cash 32185 35791 35791 30744 31533 38482 22229 25394 28740 28348 26678 24978
Investments 3224 3304 3085 2709 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519
Other non-current assets 4795 5656 8104 7929 10706 9739 10344 9231 8112 8248 8417 8592
Total investor funds 169534 183007 200231 199473 195531 196029 196803 197740 199070 200702 202532 204432
Equity 28751 29283 35704 36066 33230 31871 32645 33582 34912 36544 38374 40274
Deferred income taxes, net (11007) (9014) (9947) (9815) (11373) (11373) (11373) (11373) (11373) (11373) (11373) (11373)
Dividends payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adjusted equity 17744 20269 25757 26251 21857 20498 21272 22209 23539 25171 27001 28901
Post-retirement obligation 18096 18794 19130 18021 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096 19096
Interest-bearing debt 133694 143944 155344 155201 156435 156435 156435 156435 156435 156435 156435 156435
Adjusted debt 151790 162738 174474 173222 175531 175531 175531 175531 175531 175531 175531 175531
Total investor funds 169534 183007 200231 199473 197388 196029 196803 197740 199070 200702 202532 204432
Check: Investor funds 0 0 0 0 1857 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow
Gross cash flow 6815 7735 6757 6030 2952 3671 7008 7550 8413 9324 9915 10123
Increase in working capital 0 (1051) (6229) (3789) 5142 656 (6764) 84 (23) (811) (995) (996)
Capital expenditure 0 0 0 0 0 11 2503 1079 1013 (515) (653) (682)
Increase in other operating assets/liabilties 0 (7875) (8766) (1051) 2176 4818 (12160) (48) (94) (562) (1682) (1746)
Gross investments 0 (8926) (14995) (4840) 7318 5485 (16422) 1114 897 (1888) (3331) (3424)
Free cash flow FCF 6815 (1191) (8237) 1189 10270 9156 (9414) 8664 9310 7436 6584 6699
Decrease/(increase) in excess cash 0 (3606) (0) 5047 (2646) (5092) 16253 (3164) (3346) 391 1670 1700
Non-operating cash flow 2629 326 675 2423 (2740) 814 (758) 960 966 (290) (322) (328)
Cash flow to investors 9444 (4471) (7563) 8660 4884 4877 6080 6460 6931 7538 7932 8070
Financing cash flow
After tax interest expense 2073 2409 2837 4075 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273 4273
Decrease/(increase) in debt 0 (10250) (11400) 143 (1234) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease/(increase) in post-retirement obligations 0 (698) (336) 1109 (1075) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payment to minority interests (2) 11 26 18 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease/(increase) in equity 3653 4057 1310 3315 2883 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dividends paid 0 0 0 0 0 604 1807 2187 2658 3265 3659 3797
Total financing cash flow 5724 (4471) (7563) 8660 4884 4877 6080 6460 6931 7538 7932 8070
Check: Cash flow to investors = Financing cash flow (3720) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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